Types of Constructivism : Raskin

Epistemological and Hermeneutic Constructivisms

Chiari and Nuzzo (1996b) argue that all constructivist psychologies attempt to conceptually bridge realist and idealist approaches to knowledge. Realism holds that “material objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense experience,” while idealism maintains that “no such material objects or external realities exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them, the whole world being dependent on the mind” (p. 166). Building on the idea that constructivist approaches grapple to overcome the realism-idealism dichotomy, Chiari and Nuzzo (1996b) distinguish two broad categories of constructivism—epistemological and hermeneutic. Particular theories of constructivism can presumably be located within one category or the other.

Epistemological constructivism. Epistemological constructivists are not purely idealists because they believe in the existence of an external reality that is independent of the observer. However, they also believe that it is not possible for observers to know that independent reality except through their constructions of it. Therefore, knowledge is a compilation of human‑made constructions. Such constructions are heuristic fictions useful for understanding the world. In this regard, epistemological constructivism sees knowledge schemes as being classifiable as more or less viable rather than more or less accurate. People cannot know for certain if their constructions correspond to an independent reality, but they can know if their constructions work well for them. In this regard, people are cognitively closed systems: “In fact, it is really with the idea of a closure of cognitive systems that the subject/object dichotomy is substantially overcome and traditional realistic perspectives are actually abandoned” (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996b, p. 171). Von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism seems to most clearly exemplify epistemological constructivism, although Kelly’s personal construct psychology also fits nicely.

Hermeneutic constructivism. Hermeneutic constructivists do not believe in the existence of an observer-independent reality. They consider knowledge a product of the linguistic activity of a community of observers. Thus, there can be as many knowledge systems as there are groups discursively negotiating them. In hermeneutic approaches to constructivism, the roles of language, discourse, and communication become central in understanding how knowledge systems are developed and maintained. There are many forms of hermeneutic constructivism, but they all share certain fundamental premises.

Although their historical backgrounds are different, all these approaches share a view of knowledge (and truth) as interpretation, an interpretation historically founded rather than timeless, contextually verifiable rather than universally valid, and linguistically generated and socially negotiated rather than cognitively and individually produced. (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996b, p. 174)

Gergen’s social constructionism can be considered an example of hermeneutic constructivism and Maturana’s radical constructivism appears to contain hermeneutic elements.

Limited realism. Chiari and Nuzzo (1996b) discuss a third approach to bridging the realism-idealism dimension. They call it limited realism. Limited realists believe that an external reality exists. They also contend that it is possible to know that reality directly. However, because human perception is fallible, limited realists assume that the correspondence between knowledge and reality is imperfect. According to Chiari and Nuzzo, cognitive psychologists such as Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck should be considered limited realists because they emphasize the correction of erroneous thinking that distorts reality or is illogical (DeRubeis & Beck, 1988; Dryden & Ellis, 1988). Thus, despite Ellis’ recent claims to being a constructivist (Ellis, 1997, 1998), Chiari and Nuzzo’s (1996b) criteria imply that his rational emotive therapy is a form of limited realism.

Some constructivists, such as Mahoney (1991), at times seem to espouse limited realism (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996b). A case can even be made that Kelly’s personal construct psychology—considered by many the first systematic use of constructivism within clinical psychology—is a form of limited realism (Stevens, 1998). Chiari and Nuzzo (1996b) contend that limited realist approaches should not be considered constructivist because such approaches claim that subjective representations mirror, with varying degrees of accuracy, an independent reality. Chiari and Nuzzo (1996b) suggest

that the label psychological constructivism should be limited to the set of theories and approaches that strive to transcend the traditional opposition between realism and idealism by adopting the metatheoretical assumption that the structure and organization of the known—the knower as known included—are inextricably linked to the structure of the knower. The link may be in the form of an ordering and organization of a world constituted by the person’s experience (epistemological constructivism) or in the sense that operations of distinctions in language constitute the generation and validation of all reality (hermeneutic constructivism). (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996b, p. 178)

I have outlined Chiari and Nuzzo’s (1996b) distinction between hermeneutic and epistemological constructivism to provide a framework for discussing three distinct psychological constructivisms: personal construct psychology (PCP), radical constructivism (RC), and social constructionism (SC). I do not consider this framework to be a “final” classification, but it does constitute one potentially helpful way to map the extensive constructivist terrain.

Constructivism in Psychology: Personal Construct Psychology, Radical Constructivism, and Social Constructionism
Jonathan D. Raskin