Performative Contradiction

A serious philosophical argument often brought against deconstruction, for 

example by Habermas (1987: 185–210), is that it is subject to the performa- 

tive contradiction. Simply put, this mistake is made when there is a contra- 

diction between what you say, and the way in which you say it. Thus 

Habermas claims that when Derrida argues against reason, he has to make 

use of rational means. ‘Anyone who argues against reason is necessarily 

caught up in a contradiction: she asserts at the locutionary level that reason 

does not exist, while demonstrating by way of her performance in argumen- 

tative processes that such reason does in fact exist’ (Fleming, 1996: 169). 

The claim made above – that we can never have complete knowledge of 

complex systems – falls into the same trap. It looks like an absolute state- 

ment about complex things but denies that such a statement can be made. 

Whether Habermas is correct in his assessment that Derrida argues 

against reason13is of less importance now than it is to look at the ‘logic’ of 

the performative contradiction. The first thing one should notice is that most 

careful or modest claims will come under pressure from this test. The claim 

‘no sentence has an exact meaning’ obviously fails the test, but the claim 

‘perhaps some sentences are not perfectly clear’ is also in trouble. If it is 

correct, then the sentence itself is perfectly clear. If it is not correct, then 

perhaps all sentences are clear. This point can be made more explicit by 

examining what kind of statements would passthe test. The claim, ‘When I 

am rational I will always be right’ passes the test with flying colours! It may 

not be true, but there is no contradiction between what I say and how I am 

saying it. I am always right, and I am also right that I am always right, and 

I can make this claim in an assertive tone of voice. 

Surely a test that will pass most self-assertive, macho claims and 

that will fail most modest claims, cannot be all that useful when dealing 

with complex things. Some reasons for this can be supplied. The performa- 

tive contradiction is predicated on the assumption that one can adequately 

distinguish between the performative and the locutionary levels, and, in 

the terms Habermas uses to criticize Derrida, between logic and rhetoric. 

However, in order to make this distinction clearly, one would need to take 

in a position that can characterize what is being said from an external 

vantage point. In the language of complexity, that would mean that one 

has access to a framework that is not the result of a strategic choice, i.e. 

some objective meta-framework. This is exactly what the view from 

complexity is sceptical about. The argument is that our frameworks are 

all compromised to some extent; dealing with complexity is a little messy. 

As Derrida (1988: 119) says: if things were simple, word would have gotten 

around.14 

In a way, the view from complexity acknowledges that some form of 

performative tension is inevitable. We are playing in what Wood (1990: 150) 

calls the ‘theatre of difficulty’, and this requires a certain ‘performative 

reflexivity’ (1990: 132). We need to demonstrate the difficulties we are in; 

also in the way we talk about them. Our discourse should reflect the 

complexities. To talk about the complex world as if it can be understood 

clearly is a contradiction of another kind15and this is a contradiction with 

ethical implications. Those who claim to have access to the truth are denying 

us our critical perspective and, therefore, keep us in a kind of false 

consciousness by not restoring the world to its original difficulty. It is only 

by acknowledging that we are in trouble that we can start grappling with the 

complexities around us. 

DOI: 10.1177/0263276405058052 

 2005 22: 255Theory Culture SocietyPaul Cilliers 

Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism