Epistemology : Constructivism : Von Glaserfeld

" I now try to avoid the terms ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowl- edge’ for constructivism, because they tend to imply the traditional scenario according to which novice subjects are born into a ready-made world, which they must try to discover and ‘represent’ to themselves. From the constructivist point of view, the subject cannot tran- scend the limits of individual experience.” (Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 1–2)

In his early studies Ernst von Glasersfeld noted a problem in Wittgenstein’s (1933) assertions about comparing our picture of reality with the reality in question in order to determine whether or not our own picture was true or false. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1987) comments:

“How could one possibly carry out that comparison? With that question, although I did not know it at the time, I found myself in the company of Sextus

Empiricus, of Montaigne, Berkeley, and Vico ... the company of all the coura- geous sceptics who ... have maintained that it is impossible to compare our image of reality with a reality outside. It is impossible, because in order to check whether our representation is a ‘true’ pic- ture of reality we should have to have access not only to our representation but also to that outside reality before we get to know it. And because the only way in which we are supposed to get at reality is precisely the way we would like to check and verify, there is no possible escape from the dilemma.” (Glasersfeld 1987, pp. 137–138).

So here is a very clear condemnation of “epistemological cheating” – the impossible feat of trying to peep around our perceptual “goggles” to see if our “picture” is approxi- mating to the “real reality” or not."




(Re: comparison with other peoples / other cultures)

To continue his elaboration, von Glasersfeld (1995) says that our knowledge does not constitute a picture of the world.

“It does not represent the world at all – it comprises action schemes, concepts, and thoughts, and it distinguishes the ones that are considered advantageous from those that are not. In other words, it per- tains to the ways and means the cognizing subject has conceptually evolved in order to fit into the world as he or she experi- ences it.” (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 114) In this relationship of knowledge to “real-

ity” 

we see that it is a matter not of searching for an iconic representation of reality but rather the search for ways of “fitting” the con- straints that the environment provides. The real world is “contacted” by the system only where his modes of fitting the constraints break down and do not manage to allow him to circumnavigate the encountered impediments. 

(Metalanguage)

 It is also clear from his use of the metaphor of lock/key that one may be outfitted with a range of alternative keys one of which may work better than others to open the lock. This is an idea common to other constructiv- ists, notably among them George Kelly (1955), whose constructivist theory applied to clinical psychology and psychotherapy was premised on the notion of “.” 

(***** link Kelly - Constructivism******)

for von Glasersfeld the notion of “truth” is replaced by that of “viability” and “fit.” For Maturana it is not so much an issue of “fitting” or “viability”

Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/